By this view then the disciplines cannot be taught as final 'distillations' of knowledge unchallengeable and unchanging and should not be taught as incontestable and fundamental structures and texts. This would provide a deeply-flawed epistemology, pedagogically unsound and intellectually dubious, for in human scholarship 'final distillations' and 'fundamental' truths are elusive concepts. We are back with the dual face of socially contexted knowledge - both because knowledge and curriculum are pedagogically realised in a social context and are originally conceived of and constructed in such a context.

The alternatives to such a dominant view continue to surface. In the contemporary debate we find certain radical teachers taking the comprehensive ideal seriously and arguing that in such a milieu knowledge and curricula must be presented as provisional and liable to reconstruction. Armstrong writes that his 'contention is that the process of education should imply a dynamic relationship between teacher, pupil and task out of which knowledge is reconstructed, for both teacher and pupil, in the light of shared experience'.(21) He likens this in some way to the philosopher R.S. Peters' writing about conversation:

Conversation is not structured like a discussion group in terms of one form of thought or towards the solution of a problem. In a conversation lecturing to others is bad form; so is using the remarks of others as springboards for self-display. The point is to create a common world to which all bring their distinctive contributions. By participating in such a shared experience much is learnt, though no one sets out to teach anyone anything. And one of the things that is learnt is to see the world from the viewpoint of another whose perspective is very different(22).

Armstrong then comments:

Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, Peters assumes that conversation is possible only between people who are already 'well-educated'. A large part of the contemporary philosophy of education rests on this mistake.(23)

A Brief Excursion into Philosophy of Education in Britain

In the above section we traced the emergence of the epistemologies related to State schooling. In the contemporary 'settlement' the school subject stands as the main manifestation of curriculum and the philosophy of education has provided a range of insights and comments on the status and origins of subjects, disciplines and forms and fields of knowledge. I do not here want to intrude too far on the debate between the philosophical absolutionists and social relativists: plainly a dialogue of the deaf. My concern is rather to characterise the implicit posture of much of the 'philosophy of education' which is institutionalised and taught with regard to the school curriculum. At its heart, 'philosophy of education' seems to hold itself well above the fray of curriculum as existing and as currently realised. The core of this aloofness is a commitment to rational and logical pursuit. But the other side of the coin is a resistance to the force of social influence. It is as if the philosopher searches for truths beyond social interference. This is true even of more liberal philosophers. Take Hirst, for instance, objective knowledge he says:

is a form of education knowing no limits other than those necessarily imposed by the nature of rational knowledge and thereby developing in man (sic) the final court of appeal in all human affairs.(24)

or Pring

Forms of knowledge therefore are fundamental structures picked out by characteristic concepts and characteristic tests of truth. They are not options open to us; they constitute what it means to think and they characterise all our particular judgements.(25)

Whatever the carefully constructed 'let out' clauses i.e. the philosophical discourse the likely implication to be drawn is that the 'philosopher king' knows only 'truth'; there are no options for they have access to a truth beyond culture and beyond history. The static, a-historical 'givenness' of the position is shown when Hirst asserts "to acquire knowledge is to become aware of experience as structured, organised and made meaningful in some quite specific way".(25) "Quite specific" indeed and quite possibly a misrepresentation of reality. No matter we are invited to embrace the fait accompli.