I believe part of the problem of reconceptualising our study of schooling can be illustrated in the basic etymology of curriculum. The word curriculum derives from the Latin word currere, which means to run, and refers to a course (or a racing-chariot). The implications of etymology are that curriculum is thereby socially constructed and defined as a course to be followed, or most significantly, presented. As Barrow notes "as far as etymology goes, therefore the curriculum should be understood to be 'the presented content' for study".(1) Social context and construction by this view is relatively unproblematic for by etymological implication the power of 'reality-definition' is placed firmly in the hands of those who 'draw up' and define the course. The bond between curriculum and sequential prescription then was forged early; it has survived and strengthened over time. Part of the stregthening of this bond has been the emergence of sequential patterns of learning to follow and operationalise the curriculum as prescribed.
At a certain level of discourse this may well be a sustainable position. But facing the process of teaching forms of knowledge are we still in a position where "they are not options open to us": on this point some of the philosophers show signs of almost human ambivalence. Others however, have the strength of their convictions. Phenix for instance deliberately equates the disciplines with teachability:

My theme has been that the curriculum should consist entirely of knowledge which comes from the disciplines, for the reason that the disciplines reveal knowledge in its teachable forms.(26)

The 'disciplines' then are imposed by the nature of rational knowledge, they are 'fundamental structures' not options open to us. Clearly such fundamental distillations should be used as the basis of teaching.

Phenix's statement reveals I think the likely policy outcome of the more recently dominant mode of theorising in philosophy of education. Whatever the qualifications, whatever the studied detachment, the likely effect of the posture will be a prescriptive curriculum. From a certainty that "there are no options" it is clear that prescriptive objectives for schooling will be both the expectation and the culmination.

The extent to which philosophy has in fact contributed in this way can be seen in a wide range of curriculum books from specialists of all kinds, the work of Bruner and Phenix in the United States through to Lawton and Peters in the United Kingdom. Lawton is a particularly useful example of how an experienced curriculum specialist receives the messages of the philosopher. In assessing Hirst's view Lawton argues: "the theory seems to me to run as follows: the first principle is that we should be clear about our educational goals. The second is that 'the central objectives of education are developments of the mind'." He adds later:

I have included Hirst's viewpoint here as an example of curriculum planning which is largely 'non-cultural' in the sense of being transcultural. This is because Hirst sees the curriculum largely in terms of knowledge, and the structure and organisation of knowledge is, by his analysis, universal rather than culturally based".(27)

Philosophy then leads us beyond culture and above all leads to curriculum theories which allow us to 'be clear about our educational goals' which relate to 'developments of the mind'. The emphasis on 'the mind' confirms the fundamental pre-eminence of the 'disciplines'.
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